Labor's Love Lost—*Willard Shelton*

THE Nation

February 17, 1951

Peace By-passed

Why the U. N. Rebuffed China

BY LILLIE SHULTZ

*

Right People in the Right Place

Can We Stretch Our Man-Power to Fit?

BY KEITH HUTCHISON

*

Germans Don't Want to Fight

BY BASIL DAVIDSON

*

"The Rose Tattoo"

BY MARGARET MARSHALL

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Next Week in THE *Nation*

MIDWINTER BOOKS

SINCLAIR LEWIS

An Essay by Joseph Wood Krutch

REVIEWS

"THE FAR SIDE OF PARADISE" by *Arthur Mizener*
Reviewed by Delmore Schwartz

"DISTURBER OF THE PEACE" by *William Manchester*
Reviewed by George Genzmer

"STEPHEN CRANE" by *John Berryman* **Reviewed by Morton Dauwen Zabel**

"CROCE, THE KING, AND THE ALLIES" by *Benedetto Croce*
Reviewed by Frances Keene

"LUCIEN LEUWEN" by *Stendhal* **Reviewed by Gerald Sykes**

"THE 1950's COME FIRST" by *Edwin G. Nourse*
Reviewed by Charles E. Noyes

"THE CAUTIOUS REVOLUTION" by *Ernest Watkins*
Reviewed by Keith Hutchison

"MUSICAL COMEDY IN AMERICA" by *Cecil Smith*
Reviewed by Frederic Ramsey, Jr.

In the Same Issue

THE VATICAN VERSUS PUBLIC EDUCATION IN FRANCE
by Paul Blanshard

THE HIGH COST OF TOTAL WAR **by Fritz Sternberg**

Coming Soon

ANTILLEAN TRIANGLE
Puerto Rico, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic **by Selden Rodman**

THE ROAD TO LABOR PEACE **by Stuart Chase**

AMERICANS DON'T RETREAT!
A Report on Censorship in Korea **by Robert P. Martin**

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THE Nation

AMERICA'S LEADING LIBERAL WEEKLY SINCE 1865

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The Shape of Things

"THE U. S. ARMY," WROTE RAY CROMLEY IN the *Wall Street Journal* of February 9, "intends to fight straight across the Thirty-eighth Parallel and occupy much of Red North Korea." It would not attempt to reach the Yalu River again but would probably seek to establish a strong line across Korea's "waist" and from there continue attacks designed to "chew up" the Chinese armies. But two questions seem to be pertinent. Has the strategy of reinvading North Korea been submitted to and approved by the U. N. and the nations which are fighting with us, or has it been decided upon unilaterally? Has due consideration been given to the effects of war *à l'outrance* on the population of Korea? For it is not only the Reds who are being "chewed up." A report in the New York *Times* of February 9 tells of the retaking by an American armored column of a small village which a few days earlier had been hit by a napalm raid. "The inhabitants throughout the village and in the fields were caught and killed and kept the exact postures they had held when the napalm struck—a man about to get on his bicycle, fifty boys and girls playing in an orphanage, a housewife strangely unmarked holding in her hand a page torn from a Sears Roebuck catalogue. . . . There must be almost 200 dead in the tiny hamlet." It begins to look as if there will not be many Koreans left to enjoy the freedom we have promised them.

*

HOWEVER, THE PROBLEM OF WHETHER OR not to cross the line into North Korea has become for the time being an academic one. Again the optimistic predictions of generals and correspondents have been proved false by events, as new Chinese divisions have checked the U. N. advance and driven southward. At the same time the prospect for ending the war by negotiation is more somber than ever. Many United Nations delegates are pondering the words of Sir Benegal N. Rau's last appeal to explore all possibilities of settlement and build further efforts for peace on the constructive aspects of the various notes from Peking. "We hope still," said Prime Minister Nehru speaking in New Delhi last Monday, "that it may be possible that events [in Korea] will take a better turn in the future, but I must confess that at the moment hope has grown very dim." Certainly there is no possibility of a peaceful solution as long as the United States continues to refuse to negotiate during a retreat, out of considerations of prestige, and spurns negotiations when United Nations forces are advancing on the ground that it is ridiculous to throw away any military advantage. What hope remains rests with the new cease-fire committee and with those forces in the United Nations and elsewhere that still oppose any talk of sanctions against China.

*

THE EPIDEMIC OF "SICKNESS" WHICH KEPT so many railroad switchmen from their jobs was probably organized on a local rather than a national basis, and there is no proof that top officials of the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, the union involved, were insincere when they appealed to their members to return to work. But whether the inspiration was local or national, the walkout was a disservice to the nation as well as a mistake in tactics. Wildcat strikes nearly always hurt labor's public relations without winning commensurate benefits. Yet we can understand the switchmen's exasperation and well believe that they were indeed "sick" of interminable delays in negotiations if not physically ill. The fact is that procedures under the Railroad Labor Act put a premium on passive resistance by the party to a dispute that wishes to maintain the status quo—in this case the companies. Moreover, that premium was enhanced last August when the government seized the railroads and obtained an injunction against strikes. Management then had nothing to lose and everything to gain by obstinacy. Much has been made of the fact that the presidents of the Brotherhoods signed a memorandum of agreement on December 21 providing for a wage increase much smaller than the trainmen had requested twenty-two months ago before prices turned upward and railroad profits began to expand rapidly. Because the union's committee of general chairmen failed to ratify this agreement, Mr. Truman accused the Brotherhood chiefs of "running out like a bunch of Russians," thereby once again displaying his tendency to let temper govern judgment. He followed this stupid charge by orders to the army to break the strike, which was in fact already petering out. As a result, the men have returned to work in a mood of bitterness that bodes ill for the future.

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• IN THIS ISSUE •

EDITORIALS

The Shape of Things 145

The Futility of Censorship 147

Prospects of Change *by Freda Kirchwey* 147

ARTICLES

Labor's Love Lost *by Willard Shelton* 149

Peace: Why It Was By-passed *by Lillie Shultz* 150

The Right People in the Right Place *by Keith Hutchison* 154

Arms for Germany? II. Germans Don't Want War *by Basil Davidson* 156

BOOKS AND THE ARTS

Moments of Vision *by Ernest Jones* 158

Society and Politics *by Joseph Kraft* 159

Books in Brief 160

Drama *by Margaret Marshall* 161

Art *by Manny Farber* 162

Records *by B. H. Haggin* 163

CROSSWORD PUZZLE No. 400 *by Frank W. Lewis* 164

LETTERS TO THE EDITORS opposite 164

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ACTING ON A TIP, SAYS THE NEW YORK *Times*, Frank Schroeder, an investigator for the new Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Subversive Activities —Senator McCarran's little Gestapo—raided the farm of Edward C. Carter at Lee, Massachusetts, and seized "voluminous files" of the Institute of Pacific Relations. Senators on the committee promise sensational "revelations" when the files are examined. So the old, dismal, shameful peepshow opens again with some of the same characters and the worn and discredited charges. "Investigators and Senators on the subcommittee plan a detailed examination of the files next week behind closed doors." It all sounds pretty mysterious and pretty ominous until one discovers that the "raid" and the "seizure" and the "examination" and the "closed doors" are all part of the off-stage sound effects. These documents were gone over in 1950 by agents of the FBI who, *on the invitation of the Institute*, spent weeks in Mr. Carter's barn, where old files have been stored. Mr. Carter himself, formerly secretary general of the institute, helped the FBI investigators, even installing oil heaters to keep them warm while they worked. But never mind the facts; "revelations" are needed to excite the customers—you and me—and it is easy enough to stage them. Simply "act on a tip," dispatch a truck to the "hiding place," serve a subpoena on the neighbor who has Mr. Carter's key—not on any responsible officer of the institute—and make off with the correspondence of a reputable organization. Then tell the newspaper and radio men about the sensations that are to follow. That the whole thing is a fake and a mockery of justice will doubtless not disturb Senator McCarran's subcommittee, especially when it is in a hurry to establish its rights to the headlines before the President's new Security Commission gets under way.

*

THE CLOSING OF *LA PRENSA*, ARGENTINA'S leading newspaper and one of the most important independent journals in the Americas, has aroused widespread interest in this country. But the real story of why the Buenos Aires daily finally became the victim of official repression has not been told. At the root of the conflict is the fact that *La Prensa*, as was its professional duty, gave much space to the recent Argentine railway strike. That strike, marking the end of Perón's honeymoon with the workers, put the Argentine dictator into a state of frenzy. Perón realized that the railway workers' action had destroyed the legend of a social-welfare state, in which he played the popular hero in a struggle against Argentine landowners and American capital to improve the condition of the laboring class. Three thousand railroad workers have been imprisoned as a result of the strike; 160 union officials are under trial; a dozen Socialist leaders have been arrested and the police are hunting two of the most prominent—Américo Ghioldi and Juan

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Antonio Solari. The strike led to a ministerial crisis and Perón's dismissal of Colonel Castro, his Minister of Transportation. All this *La Prensa* reported fully and without bias and as a reprisal Perón suspended the paper. Everybody knows that the dispute with the pro-government news-vendors was a transparent pretext. *La Nacion*, the other leading Buenos Aires daily, has just published a courageous editorial proclaiming its solidarity with *La Prensa* and its readiness to accept the same fate. The incident represents the first open defiance of the Perón regime since the 1946 elections.

*

THE WORLD BANK HAS DECIDED NOT TO ASK for competitive bids on its future bond issues but instead to place them through a sponsoring and managing group of thirty-two commercial and investment banks, with which terms will be negotiated. Among the members of this group we note both J. P. Morgan and Company and Halsey, Stuart and Company, the Montagues and Capulets of the financial world, who are, respectively, the champions of private and permanent links between banker and borrower, and the vociferous advocates of competitive bidding. The feat of persuading these two lions to lie down together should enhance Bank President Eugene Black's reputation in Wall Street. It is hardly likely to prove as popular with the anti-trust division of the Department of Justice, which is now seeking to enjoin seventeen leading investment houses, most of them in the World Bank's group, from restrictive practices which, it charges, have largely eliminated competition among them.

The Futility of Censorship

ALLEN TATE'S letter to the New York *Times* of February 1 dealing with the attempt to suppress "The Miracle" seems to us an admirable formulation of the Catholic point of view—as that point of view should be if Catholics really accept the principle of the separation of church and state. The central question, says Mr. Tate, is whether any institution in the United States, civil or religious, has the *legitimate* authority (italics ours) to suppress books and motion pictures, however disagreeable they may be to certain persons on theological grounds. His answer is no. He goes on to say that New York State has the legal authority to suppress "The Miracle," but he challenges the legitimacy of this authority. He points out that the Catholic church has full authority to condemn "The Miracle" publicly and forbid it to the faithful but that any attempt by the church to implement its religious authority with civil force is a usurpation of secular power. In this case, he believes, there has been no official action by the church: "what has happened is that Catholic individuals and groups have brought pressure to bear upon New York politicians to uphold by force what they believe to be Catholic standards"—and he asserts that this is "a violation not only of the relation of church and state but of the great Catholic moral and intellectual tradition, and points also to a latent heresy . . . that has been variously known as Puritanism and Jansenism."

In the two last issues of *The Nation*, Gilbert Seldes presented an admirable formulation of the non-Catholic point of view; and the interesting thing is that the two formulations perfectly complement each other. This seems to indicate that Catholic and Protestant would have no quarrel if each adhered conscieniously to the principle of the separation of church and state which is the law of the land—for Protestants are not exactly guiltless on this score. As for the immediate issue, censorship, we recommend to those who when they happen to be "offended" reach for the weapon of suppression Mr. Tate's brief but definitive paragraph on its futility:

> Bad books and plays, bad as literature and bad as morality, in the long run suppress themselves. No good book or play can ever be suppressed. When we remember that the works of Dante Alighieri were publicly burned by a fourteenth-century pope, the weapon of suppression begins to look ridiculous.

Prospects of Change

BY FREDA KIRCHWEY

THE rearming of West Germany, for so long the central demand of the Pentagon planners, has run into new obstacles. Opposition continues in Germany itself, despite the pardon of Nazi war criminals and other American concessions to renascent nationalism. Adenauer has done his best to counter this feeling, but his efforts have been offset by the energetic campaign of the Socialists and by Grotewohl's conciliatory moves. Since unity would endanger the very existence of the governing coalition, as well as the plan to integrate West Germany with the Atlantic Alliance, Adenauer's stakes are immense, but even so he cannot openly oppose the reunion of the German states. He can only set conditions that he believes the Communists will have to reject, such as completely free all-German elections and a general political amnesty in the East. But while he temporizes, hoping for the worst, sentiment for unity mounts and with it hostility to the idea of contributing German troops to an American-led "European" army.

At the same time opposition to German rearmament has been increasing in Western Europe, especially in Britain and France, to a point where it threatens to delay the whole Western defense program. The revival of this feeling undoubtedly accounted for General Eisenhower's suggestion that the arming of Germans could wait. His statement caused widespread speculation, since it flew in the face of decisions already made in Brussels and Washington. But Eisenhower is a better political psychologist

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than most of his colleagues in State and Defense; and he knows how little strength will be contributed by divisions constructed out of reluctant human material and foisted on a reluctant, even hostile, army. Whether his shrewd sense of timing can in the end overcome these obstacles, it is too soon to say. But one thing is clear: the original American purpose to arm and mobilize Germans without regard for popular resentment in Germany or the West, without even considering the possibility of reaching an agreement with the Russians on the whole German issue, has been superseded. For the time being the issue of German military revival has been set aside, and plans for a four-power conference have been permitted to develop.

Apparently Washington believes it can count on Soviet truculence and trickery to prove the uselessness of such negotiations and the need of maintaining West Germany as a separate entity under Western control. Russian tactics during the China debate at Lake Success must have encouraged that view. But it is not impossible that Moscow, wanting above everything to prevent the rearming of Bonn, will display an irritating and unnerving resonableness. In this case Washington may be forced to make concessions to the principle of unity, to which it is at least formally committed but which no longer serves its ends.

The only advantage Washington might gain from an agreement on Germany would be that the Atlantic Pact nations would no longer suspect this country of trying to prevent negotiations in order to push its military program. If this deadly suspicion were removed, political opposition might subside and the arms program actually move ahead faster and with less friction. But of course a contrary effect might be produced: the mere hint that the danger of war had been reduced by negotiation could bring about a relaxation of the armament effort. For the United States has geared its arms program in Europe to a psychology of fear, constantly renewed by warnings from Washington and the imminence of Russian armed power. A gamble on reduced tension is something the Washington chiefs have not cared to risk.

However, an easing of tension offers the only possibility of achieving the sort of rearmament through which Europe can hope to find equilibrium. As Eisenhower realizes, a defense program, if it is to be really that, must have the confident support of the people. It must not depend for its momentum on whipping up fear and ferocity; it must not press too heavily on a standard of living already below the point of political safety; it must not encourage domestic reaction or arouse popular indignation by alliances which make a mockery of our "defend-freedom" slogans.

Nobody except the Communists would argue that the Western powers should be stripped of troops and arms while their neighbors to the East remain partly mobilized and fully prepared. As long as no agreements have been reached for full or partial disarmament, the West must build up a defense apparatus that will right the balance. But if war is to be avoided rather than precipitated, this job should be done in a sober fashion, without threats, without promises to "liberate" every satellite, and without for a moment ceasing to try for agreement on large issues and small—on trade, on arms reduction, on Germany and Austria, on Japan.

THE role the United States has played recently has damaged our good name in many lands, not least among our allies. The idea has spread abroad that we plan the destruction of Communist power rather than the defeat of aggression and are ready to risk all-out war if necessary to achieve our end. This belief is rearing obstacles in our path in London and Paris, as well as among the neutrals. Prime Minister Attlee's public demand that we consult our allies before sending the U. N. forces across the Thirty-eighth Parallel in Korea was a necessary act of political appeasement. Objections to American control are getting more and more vocal in the ranks of the Labor Party and even in the government. It will take all the skill of an Eisenhower, together with a sharp change in policy, to convince our Western allies of the accuracy of the general's assurance that "what we are trying to do cannot honestly be considered by any other nation as a threat to its existence, as a threat to any peaceful purpose it may have." The best proof that we mean what Eisenhower said would be an honest attempt to bring about a four-power meeting and make it a success.

Instead of leaving the initiative to the Russians, the Western powers could offer to drop all plans for German rearmament in return for certain concessions and explicit guaranties on the part of Moscow. They could demand the complete withdrawal of military and political personnel, strict democratic safeguards to insure free, all-German elections, and the disbanding, prior to any vote, of armed police, people's courts, and concentration camps for political offenders. The West could, in short, set terms which, if rejected, would throw grave suspicions on Russia's purposes but which if accepted, would open the way to a neutral, unarmed, united Germany whose existence might be an element of stability in Europe rather than a permanent threat to the peace. With this as a beginning, other more controversial issues could be negotiated with some hopeful expectation.

Next Week in *The Nation*

The Nazi Industrialists Go Free

An examination of the commutation of the war crime sentences in Germany

by TELFORD TAYLOR

Chief Counsel at the Nürnberg Trials

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Labor's Love Lost

BY WILLARD SHELTON

Washington, February 8

THE bitter quarrel between organized labor and Mobilization Czar Charles E. Wilson has been described in the press as primarily a dispute over who should control civilian man-power—a question settled today by President Truman in Wilson's favor. Actually the quarrel was a manifestation of labor's distrust of Wilson's whole philosophy. The union leaders resent his contemptuous disregard for labor's advice and assistance and believe he is allowing the corporation and banking interests that President Roosevelt held in check during World War II to use the mobilization program for their own advantage. They are convinced that if he continues to have his way the defense emergency will be exploited to weaken labor's rights and that the ultimate result will be a change for the worse in the pattern of American democracy.

At one time, when Wilson was a ranking official in the War Production Board under Roosevelt and Donald Nelson, he talked like an intelligent conservative. In December, 1943, he suggested that our post-war objective should be to see that workers had a chance to earn more of the good things of American life. He spoke of higher wages without higher prices and warned his fellow business men against the radicalism of the extreme right. By early 1946, after his return to General Electric, he had changed his tune and grimly rejected wage increases before OPA approval of price rises. His attitude since last December, when he talked Mr. Truman into an extraordinary delegation of power as his price for taking the mobilization job, indicates how far he has departed from his earlier professions.

He has blandly ignored labor's urgent requests for a representative in the top rank of his advisers, on the same level as Sidney Weinberg, the Wall Street banker, and Lucius Clay, the retired general and chairman on leave of absence of Continental Can. He would be glad, he has said, to have "on his staff"—in an unspecified capacity—someone like Walter P. Reuther of the C. I. O. United Automobile Workers, Al Hayes of the A. F. of L. Machinists, or George Harrison of the A. F. of L. Brotherhood of Railway Clerks, but only if the union leader would "divest himself of private interests." This would mean that labor's representative would be cut off from the source of his strength and influence. Superficially the condition may seem no different from that imposed on the industrialists who have flocked to Wilson's standard, but the industrialists have private means and the absolute assurance of return to their jobs. Wilson was willing to hire Herbert A. Bergson as general counsel for the Office of Defense Mobilization on Bergson's own terms—that is, on a no-compensation basis, though the performance of many no-compensation and dollar-a-year men in World War II verged on scandalous favoritism to their clients and corporations. He took Clay and Weinberg on a no-compensation basis, and Clay draws pay from Continental Can while working for the government.

The union leaders still insist that control of civilian man-power be vested in Secretary of Labor Tobin because they fear that Wilson will seize the first excuse to fasten a man-power draft on the country. They have noted that he favors weakening the overtime provisions of the wage-hour law, and they foresee that, supported by Weinberg and Clay, he will try to abrogate the wage-hour law and to undermine the prevailing-wage principle for government-financed business established in the Walsh-Healy and Bacon-Davis acts.

There is one basic difference between a military and a labor draft: civilians work for employers operating for private profit. If other means of obtaining vital production should fail, it might be necessary to draft civilians; a democracy can do anything essential to its survival. But a labor draft was not needed during World War II, and is certainly to be regarded as a last resort rather than a present imperative. When union spokesmen gathered to argue with Wilson about man-power policy, they were treated to a long lecture on the powers granted him by the President and were told that if they would not accept Arthur Flemming, his personal nominee, as man-power director, he would assume the responsibility himself. One of the union leaders bluntly replied: "What makes you think that would be satisfactory?"

Wilson is capable of driving the railroad strikers back to work with appeals to their patriotism, but he has not yet used his broad powers to set up machinery for settling the rail dispute or any other legitimate labor grievance. He has taken no step to roll back prices, to ask Congress for a new national rent-control law, or to seek authority to control food costs. He replaced Alan Valentine with Eric Johnston as director of the Economic Stabilization Agency but has given Johnston no authority to work out a formula on food prices fair to both farmers and consumers.

Johnston is tackling his job in a sensible spirit. Recognizing the necessity of obtaining labor's cooperation in fixing prices and wages, he has appointed a union nominee as his deputy—George Harrison of the Railway Clerks. He has an advisory committee composed of representatives of both unions and management. "The difference between Johnston's operation and Wilson's," one union lawyer says, "is the difference between black and white." But Johnston is subordinate to Wilson; he may know that new rent and food-price controls are vital, but he cannot act independently. It is suggested—and not by labor alone—that Wilson and his coterie of

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top aides are deliberately currying political favor with Congress by avoiding the hot issue of farm prices. They find it less dangerous to demand that labor cut its own throat by "voluntarily" accepting a frozen-wage formula even while Johnston admits that prices will continue to rise until next summer.

The only union leader who has publicly denounced Wilson is James B. Carey, secretary of the C. I. O., who in a Boston speech charged that Wall Street had executed a coup d'état and seized control of our economy for big business and that Mr. Truman was letting Wilson treat workers as second-class citizens. But other union leaders are saying the same thing privately. The President disregarded an urgent appeal from Philip Murray and William Green when he handed man-power control to Wilson. In likening the leaders of the rail strike to "Russians" incapable of keeping agreements, Mr. Truman reverted to his worst form.

In Great Britain, in the terrible crisis of 1940, a Tory government broadened itself into a national government and gave labor leaders responsibility for harnessing the civilian energies—the energies of free men—needed for Britain's survival. In no other democracy today would it be claimed that the bitter and difficult tasks of mobilization were the exclusive prerogative of a corporation and banking clique. With his hamfisted tactics Wilson has thus far deprived himself of the aid and counsel of American labor and opened a gulf between himself and the workers' spokesmen. If he had wanted to give a semblance of plausibility to Soviet charges that American mobilization is a Wall Street plot, he could scarcely have chosen a better course.

Peace: Why It Was By-passed

BY LILLIE SHULTZ

THE United Nations resolution branding China an aggressor will not save one drop of blood from being spilled. Nor will it strengthen peace and security. Why, then, was it adopted? Actually the resolution represented the grim presumption by both the United States and Russia that a third world war is inevitable, and was a play for stakes related to that eventuality.

Could there have been a settlement of the Korean war? Sir Benegal Rau, the delegate of India, said on February 1 that a cease-fire could have been achieved within a week had the Asian-Arab resolution been adopted.

It would be naive to assume that the forty-four countries that voted, most of them reluctantly, for the United States resolution genuinely believed that the authority of the United Nations could be maintained only by branding Mao an aggressor. Until the United States resolution of January 20 was introduced, not even the North Koreans had been formally labeled aggressors in the resolutions of the Security Council. In 1947 when the Arab states, among them a member of the Security Council, announced that they were attacking Palestine in defiance of the U. N. resolution, no effort was made to charge them with aggression. In the Indonesian war the United States opposed branding the Netherlands an aggressor lest peace negotiations be impeded. The U. N. principles of January 13 included no demand that China should accept the label of aggressor as a condition to a settlement. Why, on January 30, had it become so imperative to condemn China first and then seek to negotiate a settlement? Why, as Sir Benegal Rau put it, was it more honorable to negotiate with a branded aggressor than with a government which had not been so branded?

American insistence would seem to be in anticipation of the day when United Nations policies will force the withdrawal of Russia and its allies from the U. N. A prerequisite is a tight alliance to isolate the Eastern bloc in preparation for what may be the final contest between Russia and the democratic powers. In the meantime, the United States wants no settlement which might require concessions, political and strategic, to Communist China, Russia's ally. This is the only explanation for the extraordinary pressures exercised by the Americans to produce a vote which, instead of quenching the flame in Korea, could only fan it into a new blaze.

The behavior of the Soviet Union, on the other hand, conditioned also by the assumption of a coming global war, was based on the gamble that before the breakdown occurred, the United States could be lured into a series of military commitments in Asia which would consume our strength and perhaps divide our allies.

Had the members of the United Nations been free to act with independence and common sense, had Britain in particular continued to practice *Realpolitik*, as it started to do so brilliantly, the Korean crisis might have been resolved. Had it not been for American insistence, the members could not have failed to acknowledge that Mao Tse-tung, after at first expressing the intransigence of Moscow's tutelage, in the space of ten days had been moved by India to the position of accepting the principles set forth by the United Nations.

What are the facts? So-called Chinese "volunteers"

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entered the Korean war late in October, after General MacArthur's forces, with U. N. approval and despite India's warning that Chinese intervention would follow, crossed the Thirty-eighth Parallel and approached the Manchurian border. On January 13, with the concurrence of the United States and over the opposition of the Soviet bloc, fifty-five members of the United Nations adopted a series of principles looking toward a settlement with China of the war in Korea and other outstanding Far Eastern problems. The two basic principles were: (1) that there should be a cease-fire; (2) that as soon as the cease-fire had been arranged, the General Assembly should set up an appropriate body, on which the United States, the United Kingdom, the U. S. S. R., and the People's Republic of China would be represented, for the purpose of achieving a settlement of Far Eastern problems, including Formosa and the admission of China to the United Nations. The January 13 resolution proposed that following the cease-fire, foreign troops should be withdrawn from Korea in progressive stages; arrangements should be made for the establishment of a unified, independent state in Korea; pending the establishment of the unified, independent state, interim arrangements should be made in accordance with U. N. ideas for the administration of Korea and the maintenance of peace and security. These principles were conveyed to Peking by cable in English.

On January 17 Foreign Minister Chou En-lai replied to the U. N. proposals in a cablegram in Chinese, translated at U. N. headquarters. He insisted that a cease-fire before negotiations would "merely give U. S. troops a breathing spell" and proposed instead a seven-power conference, with the prior understanding that China's admission to the United Nations would be assured, that the United States would agree to withdraw its forces from Korea and the Formosan Straits, and that it would negotiate all other Far Eastern problems. Such a conference, China stipulated further, should be held in China.

But by January 29, twenty-four hours before the adoption of the U. N. resolution branding Communist China an aggressor, the Indian delegate had been able to place on the record a series of clarifications of Peking's position and basic concessions which Communist China had been induced to offer the United Nations. They were: (1) acceptance of the principle of cease-fire before negotiations; (2) acceptance of the principle of negotiation of problems outstanding between China and the U. N. in the Far East, following the completion of arrangements for a cease-fire.

Communist China agreed also, India reported, to withdraw its "volunteers" from Korea after the cease-fire, as part of a general agreement for the withdrawal of all foreign troops. It dropped its demands for its own recognition by the U. N. prior to negotiations and a commitment to any solution of Far Eastern problems in advance of negotiation, including its previous demand that the American navy be withdrawn from the Formosan Straits. China did ask that there be a conference of the five nations listed in the January 13 resolution of the United Nations, to which were added India and Egypt, but agreed that the first item on the agenda of this conference should be the arrangement for a cease-fire.

Warren Austin

Thus China accepted the basic principle of the January 13 U. N. resolution—namely, cease-fire first and negotiation afterward. To be sure, this acceptance was not registered in direct communications to the United Nations. It was negotiated with Peking by the Ambassador of India and transmitted to the U. N. by the Indian government. As soon as Peking's concessions were made known, the Philippines, Turkey, and Greece, backed by the United States, hastened to throw doubt on their authenticity and relevance.

THERE was no apparent reason why the Peking government, in its first official reply to the United Nation on January 17, should not have accepted the January 13 principles. Basically, they were the program set forth by the Soviet delegation last October for the peaceful settlement of the Korean crisis—a proposal which was rejected. They offered Communist China an opportunity to achieve by diplomatic means three of its chief objectives—acceptance as a negotiating power, with the door open to recognition of its claims with respect to Formosa, and the right to occupy China's seat in the United Nations. Why Peking failed to seize this opportunity when it was first offered is any man's guess. A reasonable assumption is that, dependent on Moscow for its information with respect to the United Nations, China was misled as to the intentions behind the offer.

That the U. S. S. R. had no wish to see China accept the U. N. terms was made unmistakably clear. At no time did the Soviet bloc show any interest in seeing a settlement reached. Behind the scenes in Peking a tug of war for Mao's soul was going on between India and Russia. India won the first round when it produced China's basic acceptance of the U. N. terms.

It was not until opinion had already approached the point of crystallization that the U. S. S. R. gave any indications that it regarded the Chinese replies as keeping the door open to negotiation. Although the Soviet Union

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and Poland did finally say so in the Political Committee, this aspect was completely submerged in their speeches, which were clearly intended to strengthen Mao's and the whole of Asia's distrust of Western intentions.

The Russians revealed their hand on the night of the vote in the Political Committee, when Tsarapkin introduced an amendment to the Asian resolution, dealing with the agenda of the seven-power conference. Sir Benegal Rau had already received Peking's unconditional acceptance of a cease-fire before negotiations. The Soviet representative first proposed that the cease-fire should be in two stages and, when that failed, asked the Arab-Asian bloc to accept a change making the cease-fire provisional. To this the resolution's sponsors could not agree. The entire Soviet bloc then voted against the provision which would have made the cease-fire the first item of the conference agenda—which Peking had accepted. It is notable too that the Russians at no stage tried to make the seating of China in the U. N. an item of the agenda.

Seligson

Sir Benegal N. Rau

Apparently the Russians see no advantage in peace in Asia. They are still gambling on splitting the Western alliance or, failing that, on splitting the strength of the United States by diverting the best part of it from Europe to Asia. This would seem to be their real purpose.

The United States needed the resolution on aggression in order to push forward its new concept of policy in the Far East. This policy is based on Formosa. Our intervention in Korea, in the belief that we could resolve that situation in a week, was used as a cover for our declaration with respect to Formosa and the dispatching of the Seventh Fleet to Formosan waters.

The United Nations, committed on Korea, has never backed the United States on Formosa; indeed, no valid excuse could be adduced for the U. N.'s support of the American action in Formosan waters. This is especially true in view of the Cairo declaration that Formosa belongs to China and the strong feeling of many of our Western allies that Communist China should be admitted to the United Nations and its sovereignty over Formosa, accordingly, recognized.

Formosa is strategically situated. In the event of war it would form an important link in the chain of bases protecting our Asiatic interests, including Japan and the Philippines. General MacArthur has been insistent that our policy in the Pacific requires the control of Formosa. The MacArthur viewpoint, publicly repudiated some months ago, has been strengthened by Chinese intervention in Korea. With Red China labeled an aggressor, the United States can find full justification for the continued policing of Formosan waters and can expect that sometime in the future U. N. support will also be forthcoming. For the adoption of the American resolution almost certainly means that the United States will never give up Formosa to Communist China. It means also that as long as the label of aggressor attaches to Peking, that regime will never represent China in the United Nations. It is conceivable that the United States, under the pressure of a hysterical Congress, may arm Chiang Kai-shek for both offensive and defensive operations. For this the United States requires no approval from the U. N.

COMMUNIST China, stung by the U. N. resolution, has already moved back into the Russian orbit and has rejected negotiation in the language of Moscow. The war in Korea will go on. More than that, China under Russian pressure may be pushed into military adventures elsewhere in Asia. If this happens, will the United States and the United Nations remain passive?

The imposition of sanctions, diplomatic and economic to begin with, would immediately be proposed, and a stiff legal and political battle would begin. This issue, on which the U. N. is already sharply divided, may provide the first test of the legality of the Acheson plan to by-pass the Security Council and the Russian veto. Should military sanctions be pressed, as conceivably they may be, the result could be the disintegration of the U. N. as an organization based on the principle of universality and the outbreak of war on a limited or unlimited scale. These were the possibilities clearly foreseen in the reserved and moving utterances of Sir Benegal Rau, who, together with his government, had labored unceasingly to bring about a settlement and had warned the U. N. that once the aggressor label was tied to China, negotiation would no longer be possible.

The Asian-Arab resolution proposing a seven-power exploratory conference, whose first purpose should be arrangement of "an appropriate cease-fire and after it had been put into effect . . . further deliberations," was defeated by the opposition of twenty-seven countries, a minority of the membership of the United Nations. With the exception of the Philippines and Thailand, all the Asiatic and Arab countries voted for this resolution. The members of the Atlantic Alliance, apart from Turkey and Greece, abstained.

The American resolution was adopted by a vote of

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forty-four, with seven negative votes and nine abstentions. This absolute majority in the U. N. represented one-third of the population of the world, while two-thirds of the world's population either abstained or voted against the resolution. India and Burma joined the Soviet bloc in opposing it. In the abstention column were Sweden, Afghanistan, Egypt, Indonesia, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Yemen, and Yugoslavia.

The possible consequences of this vote were understood by most of the delegates. In the speeches of Sir Gladwyn Jebb of Britain and Lester B. Pearson of Canada awareness of the dangers was striking evident. These men voted for the resolution because of the American campaign of pressure, the like of which had never been seen before. The resolutions of the House and the Senate were calculated pressures instigated by the Administration and subsequently backed by the President's declaration. In the United Nations Ambassador Austin emphasized the implicit threat that unless Europe stood with the United States in Asia, the United States would not stand with Europe in Europe.

Behind the scenes the pressure on the European countries that are dependent upon American military and financial aid was even more direct and more insistent. Delegations which privately stated that they believed China had accepted at least 90 per cent of the principles contained in the January 13 U. N. proposal supported the resolution which said just the opposite. Canada, which publicly called the United States resolution premature and unwise, could go no farther than to suggest an agenda for a seven-power conference, based on the concept of the Asian resolution, which it hoped some other delegation might offer as an amendment to that resolution. Because of its relationship to the United States, Canada could not formally offer this plan.

When it appeared that basic parts of the Canadian proposal might be adopted by the Asian-Arab group and the support of Canada thus assured, the United States blocked this by letting it be known privately that it would not agree to a cease-fire group composed of the seven conference members because it included Russia.

UNTIL the very last moment the outcome of the vote was uncertain. Great Britain held the key. Had it voted in favor of the Asian resolution, for which it sought a priority, the votes of the Scandinavian countries and Canada would have been assured, and probably those of the Benelux countries. Europe's vote would have guaranteed the adoption of the Asian-Arab resolution. In the end Sir Gladwyn Jebb did a complete somersault. On January 25 he said: "May it not be that the punishment may cause wider havoc than the crime?—that the cure may be even worse than the disease? . . . It is our duty to urge upon what appears to be the majority of this committee to think many times before they take a step which may carry us much farther on a road along which none of us is prepared to proceed in practice." On January 30 Britain voted for the American resolution and abstained on the Asian resolution—at the very moment when India had obtained the clarifications and commitment for which Britain had been asking. With Britain abstaining, it was a foregone conclusion that the other European countries would abstain as well. Each waited, up to the last moment, for some other to take the initiative. All hoped for a miracle which would make a vote on the American resolution unnecessary.

The Europeans were terrified by the thought of applying sanctions after branding China an aggressor. But it was left to Israel to propose deletion of the paragraph in the United States resolution dealing with sanctions and modification of the language charging that Communist China had refused to accept the U. N. principles. Israel's proposals were sharply tossed aside by the United States, only to emerge later in modified form as two amendments, offered by prearrangement by Dr. Malik of Lebanon. Dr. Malik was a sponsor of the Asian resolution but had been successfully courted by the United States in order to break Arab unity. These amendments gave the hesitant European countries the peg, weak though it was, on which they could hang justification for supporting the American resolution — namely, that sanctions would not be considered until the Good Offices Committee had a chance to try for a settlement.

Seligson

Nasrollah Entezam

On the day the press announced the vote in the Political Committee, the real American intention was revealed in Washington dispatches which stated that a special United States committee was studying the question of sanctions. When, none the less, Ambassador Entezam, the U. N. Assembly's President, said he would proceed to set up a Good Offices Committee and try to arrange peaceful settlement, Ambassador Gross told correspondents that he hoped due weight would be given to the temper of American opinion.

The American delegation got its resolution. But the

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Soviet Union has won the first round. Russia has succeeded in splitting the United Nations. It has strengthened Chinese intransigence and dependence on the U. S. S. R. It has dragged the United States into a position where it will be forced to commit personnel and material in increasing numbers, with no assurance that Asia in the end will not be lost to the West, or that peace is on the horizon.

The Right People in the Right Place

BY KEITH HUTCHISON

IT IS not that we do not have enough people in this country to do the job," said President Roosevelt in 1942. "The problem is to have the right numbers of the right people in the right place at the right time." Today, as I attempted to show last week, our man-power potential is adequate for the defense job in hand—partial mobilization and the building up of a trained reserve backed by growing industrial capacity and a large stockpile of arms and raw materials. Some diversion of labor from civilian to military production will be essential but not to an extent necessitating drastic cuts in living standards unless events force a much higher degree of mobilization.

The absence of an over-all man-power shortage does not mean that there will always be enough of the right men in the right place at the right time. In fact, we are already finding that the supply of highly trained man-power, both professional and manual, is too small. As long ago as the beginning of August, 1950, the Department of Labor prepared for the use of the Department of Defense a list of "critical occupations." The professional section included most varieties of engineers and chemists, many other kinds of physical scientists, and doctors, dentists, and nurses. Among craftsmen twenty-four categories of skilled mechanics were listed.

Under conditions of full mobilization the demand in essential industries for persons qualified to work in these occupations, for all of which a minimum training period of two years is required, would exceed the total supply. Indeed, acute shortages are to be anticipated even without full mobilization. Already difficulties are apparent in filling some professional positions and in recruiting certain kinds of skilled metal workers. The aircraft industry, in which employment rose from 237,000 to 407,000 during the second half of 1950, is advertising frantically for designers, draftsmen, mechanics, electricians, and other specialists. So are the 3,000 tool and die shops which turn out "original models" of tools and master patterns for stamped parts and so occupy a key position in the metal industries. These shops are working fifty hours a week to keep up with orders and expect soon to be called upon to double present production.

Such industries are complaining bitterly about the loss of skilled employees through the draft and the recall of reservists. They question the wisdom of giving draft boards full discretion to decide whether such men should be inducted or deferred. The Selective Service system, of course, operates on a basis of decentralized democracy, on the theory that a man's fellow-citizens should pass on his liability to service. In regard to deferment claims based on dependents, this is almost certainly the fairest method. But it is doubtful whether local draft boards, harassed to fill their quotas, are always capable of grasping which claims for occupational deferment are justified in the national interest, and there does seem to be a case for some kind of national review board.

If Congress agrees to draft the eighteen-year-olds, this particular difficulty will be alleviated, for few boys in this age group have acquired essential skills. But we will then face the problem of conserving our "seed corn," of insuring against a fall in the supply of trained minds. Any blanket exemption of men regarded as "good college material" would be rightly protested as undemocratic; yet if we draft all the physically fit and force them to defer their higher education, we will open up a yawning gap in our none too plentiful supply of doctors, engineers, scientists, and teachers. The nation needs, it has been estimated, some 30,000 entrants annually to various branches of engineering alone, and about this number will in fact graduate in 1951. But after that, on the basis of present college registrations, there will be a rapid decline, until in 1954 we shall have a graduating class of around 12,000. The prospective supply of new blood is also inadequate to meet the rising demand for physicists, chemists, biologists, and other experts.

The Defense Department hopes to resolve this dilemma by selecting annually on the basis of ability some 75,000 men who, after basic training, will be released until the completion of college courses. This plan seems sound in principle, but a good many questions about its operation remain to be answered. The proposed total of draftees to be given the opportunity of returning to their studies appears definitely on the low side unless the Defense Department intends to confine this group to those with aptitudes for the physical sciences. But this surely would be a gross error, for a democracy needs more than a tech-

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nical élite; it cannot afford to neglect the humanities and the social sciences. And, above all, if we are to maintain high standards of literacy we must provide an expanding supply of teachers for our rapidly growing school population. It is to be hoped, therefore, that Congress will authorize releases on a more generous scale than that suggested by the Defense Department and will intrust the selection of students to a broadly representative civilian body.

ASSUMING that large enough numbers of the right men can be found, we next have to consider ways and means of getting them to the right place at the right time. The defense program calls for a great expansion of such industries as aircraft manufacture, shipbuilding and ship repair, steel, non-ferrous-metal mining and processing, machine tools, ordnance, and electronics. In a good many cases the necessary labor will be found on the job, as, for instance, when men now producing television sets shift over to radar apparatus. But it will also be essential for large numbers of workers to move from their present places of employment to others, often in different parts of the country.

Since any form of labor draft will be acceptable only in the direst emergency, this redeployment of the labor force must be achieved through the free labor market. It will be influenced, no doubt, by indirect government controls. Credit restrictions are tending to reduce opportunities for builders, some of whom may be persuaded to seek different kinds of work; limitation or prohibition of the use of scarce raw materials in nonessential production will put some men out of their present jobs and set them hunting for new openings. Such men will find information and guidance in the local offices of the state employment services. Moreover, it is government policy to place contracts, wherever possible, in labor-surplus areas. But by and large, as in World War II, we shall depend on the individual decisions of millions of workers to bring them to the jobs where they are most needed.

Americans more than most people are easily convinced that the grass in the next field is greener, and hitherto they have been exceptionally mobile. There has long been a steady stream of migrants, especially in times of prosperity, from the South, where fertility is high, to the Northeast and West, where industrial concentration produces the largest number of job opportunities. And mobility has been occupational as well as geographical, thanks to the adaptability of Americans and their readiness to "try anything once." Thus a Census Bureau survey showed that between Pearl Harbor and the spring of 1944 one out of every five workers moved from one broad employment category—"professional," "clerical," "skilled," "semi-skilled," "farming," and so forth—to another.

Has labor mobility diminished since the end of the war? That is a question that officials in the Labor Department's Division of Defense Man-Power are pondering with some anxiety. In the past five years many more workers have become home-owners, and such men will not easily be persuaded to uproot themselves and their families unless they are guaranteed decent housing. Too many of the war-time migrants came to the conclusion that the opportunity to earn more failed to compensate for the miserable living conditions they were forced to endure.

The housing situation, therefore, provides another argument for bringing the job to the worker. But we also have to bear in mind the desirability of decentralizing industry in view of the danger of air attack, and in cases where defense requirements call for the construction of large new plants there is much to be said for their location well away from heavily populated areas. However, when isolated sites are selected, the provision of housing and full community facilities ought to be undertaken concomitantly with the building of the factory or plant. The Administration has recognized its responsibility in this matter to the extent of asking for an appropriation of $150,000,000 for defense housing and community facilities. Let us hope that Congress will not consider this a "Fair Deal" proposal calling for the pruning knife.

Another possible obstacle to mobility may be the enormous increase in the number of workers covered by union contracts providing for pensions and the protection of seniority rights. This represents an important social advance, but it does tend to make the labor force less flexible by giving men a stake in their existing jobs which they are not prepared to sacrifice for the sake of a few extra dollars in pay. In his statement to the Preparedness Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee on January 16, Secretary of Labor Tobin referred in passing to this problem and said that "measures will be required" to protect pension and seniority rights. But I do not believe that anyone in the government has yet given much thought to the nature of such measures. Possibly something could be worked out analogous to the provisions in the G. I. Bill of Rights which guaranteed that drafted men should be reinstated in their jobs without loss of seniority. Now that so many employers operate pension plans, there might also be some kind of pooling arrangement, underwritten by the government, which would enable men to be transferred from one pension roll to another. Certainly some solution must be found for the problem if we are to attain the degree of labor mobility that will be needed during the next few years.

In addition to seeking to overcome forces making for inertia, man-power policy must pay attention to positive incentives to change. Workers decide to look for and accept new jobs for many reasons, such as greater

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opportunities to use their skills and improved chances of promotion, better working conditions, a more congenial atmosphere—there are "happy" and "unhappy" plants just as there are "happy and unhappy" ships. But income is of course almost always a major consideration, and wage policies must be closely related to man-power needs. Thus while the government is attempting to stabilize wages in order to check inflation, it has to bear in mind that a permanent, universal wage freeze would tend to immobilize the labor force. We cannot allow supply and demand unfettered play in the labor market because with full, and over-full, employment the result would be a steady increase in all wages accompanied by an increase in all prices. But supply and demand for labor in certain essential industries is relevant, and if, for instance, the Wage Stabilization Board finds that men are leaving the copper mines because they can earn more in the shipyards, it may have to decide that copper-mining wages must be raised.

In this connection the question of overtime is important. At the present time some business men and some politicians are agitating for an increase in the legal working week to forty-five or forty-eight hours, with the abandonment of premium pay for overtime. Quite apart from the effect of such a step on labor morale, it would hinder rather than help full man-power mobilization. Since overtime involves additional costs, only those firms that are long on orders and short on labor will consistently operate more than forty hours. By so doing they tend to solve their difficulties, for the opportunity to earn time-and-a-half for several hours a week and so increase take-home pay attracts new workers. Thus the wage-and-hour law, by encouraging men to move from less essential to more essential employment, is not the least of our tools for getting the right people in the right place at the right time.

[*This is the concluding article in a series on Controls in a Rearmament Economy.*]

Arms for Germany?

BY BASIL DAVIDSON

II. Germans Don't Want to Fight

Bonn, January 27

IT IS not too much to say that America's demand for the rearmament of West Germany has finally destroyed Europe's war-time illusion that the New World would set right the balance of the Old. The rift between the United States and Western Europe which will develop if this demand is pressed is likely to be immeasurably deeper than that caused by European objections to America's Far Eastern policy.

Consider the line-up on rearmament in West Germany today. It is true that those who want a new German army are not the self-admitted Nazis, but they are the same coalition of conservative forces that wrecked the hopes of the Weimar Republic in the twenties and has prevented the emergence of a new Germany since the Second World War. They are the Old Guard nationalists like Adenauer and company, the heads of the great undisbanded imperial industries, the suave and self-confident Guderians, Speidels, and Heusingers who now explain in published memoirs that Germany could have won the war but for Hitler's mistakes—and but for the cardinal Allied mistake of fighting against the Germans to the finish instead of turning in good time against the Russians.

On the other side is by far the greater part of the people of West Germany. Recent newspaper polls have shown that 70, 80, and 90 per cent of those questioned oppose rearmament. Conferences and congresses to protest against it have assembled doctors, teachers, professors, lawyers, and workingmen who have no sympathy with the Stockholm movement or the Communist Party. Germans today, perhaps for the first time in history, are deeply convinced that war cannot help them, cannot solve their problems.

The division of opinion on rearmament reflects the confessional division. It is not an accident that the leaders of the opposition to Adenauer's policies are the Protestants Niemöller and Heinemann, both of whom, it should be said, hold strictly conservative views on most matters—Heinemann, for instance, is a Christian Democrat. Nor is it an accident that Adenauer's spiritual adviser is Cardinal Frings of Cologne, a cleric of the blackest hue, or that the Pope's adviser on German affairs is Monsignor Kaas, who was a power in the great Catholic *Zentrum* of the Weimar Republic. The West German state is in the most practical sense a Catholic base in Europe, in every way as self-conscious and proselytizing as, for instance, Franco's Spain; the demand for German rearmament goes hand in hand with the demand for Spain's admission to the Atlantic Pact. No one who does

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not recognize the Catholic character of the West German state can understand the present pattern of Western policy.

THE political opponents of rearmament fall into two distinct categories. In the first are those whose opposition is provisional and is pressed for tactical reasons. Among them are the Social Democratic leaders, whose position on the question does not differ in principle from that of Adenauer but who want no rearmament unless and until they can themselves carry it out. This group also includes, however, such ex-Nazis as Remer, Dorls, and von Ostau, who look forward to the day when quarrels among the victors of 1945 will enable a nationalist Germany to rise once more to supremacy in Europe.

The opposition of the other group is genuine and based on principle. It is led by Gustav Heinemann, the sober and intelligent former burgomaster of Essen, who resigned from his post as Minister of the Interior—an unprecedented step for a member of the West German government—rather than go along with Adenauer's plans for remilitarization. Heinemann does not underestimate the difficulty of coming to an agreement with the east zone, but he has no illusions about the future of West Germany if rearmament should go forward. His view is that the unification of Germany, always the basic purpose of German policy, may be difficult now, but that it will be quite impossible after bilateral rearmament. Then the guns will speak, and Germany will become once more a battlefield—with the additional horror of being the battlefield in a civil as well as an international war. Heinemann, accordingly, urges a genuine attempt at unification now, and by four-power agreement. To this end he has taken steps to find out exactly what the Communists and their Protestant allies in East Germany would be prepared to accept. A few days ago he said his investigations had convinced him that the eastern authorities were ready to make concessions on such vital matters as all-German elections, the People's Police, and a far-reaching political amnesty.

In this courageous attempt to stem the tide of hysteria Heinemann has the powerful support of Pastor Niemöller, bishop of the Evangelical church in Hesse. Perhaps because he is in no sense a politician, Niemöller has great moral influence in Germany today. One of the Kaiser's most daring and successful U-boat commanders, he was the Protestant priest who outraged his respectable congregation at Dahlem in Berlin before the Second World War by denouncing Hitler's attempt to turn the Evangelical church into an instrument of Nazi policy. At that time he founded, within the Evangelical community, the *Bekennende Kirche* and fought the Nazis until they silenced him in a concentration camp. Even at its height the *Bekennende Kirche* failed to obtain the support of more than a minority of the Evangelical hierarchy, but the best men were with him in heart and often in word. Although Niemöller and Heinemann are careful not to say so, the *Bekennende Kirche* has come to life again in the current fight against remilitarization. The Evangelical bishops who condemn Niemöller today are at one with those who found it convenient to compromise with the Nazis.

"We cannot and we ought not to keep silent," Niemöller wrote last October to his charges in Hesse, "about mistaken policies which today—even at times through the misuse of the Word of God—are leading us along a false road where we shall all be torn apart in sin and hatred." And he has not kept silent. "The church which lives by God's Word," he said, "can only reject the legend of the Christian West as a romantic camouflage applied by secular power politics." His open letter to Adenauer of last October contains this paragraph:

> Before the eyes and ears of the whole German people, Mr. Chancellor, I beg of you in this decisive hour not to present the citizens of the Federal Republic with an accomplished fact without first genuinely consulting their wishes. If such a consultation cannot be carried out through a referendum within the terms of the constitution, then there should be a new general election. But this new general election must be organized in such a manner that the electorate may be able clearly to ask all parliamentary candidates whether, if elected, they will stand for or against rearmament.

Adenauer cannot risk an election, for he knows that the majority of the people would vote for candidates who are against rearmament. Provincial elections in Hesse, Württemberg, and Bavaria have proved that. But the opposition continues to grow. Loosely organized as yet, it is spreading across the whole spectrum of German society. "It would be much more difficult to mobilize an army in West Germany today than it would have been a year ago," a German ex-general told me privately, "and it may be impossible if we have to wait another two years." This being the situation, every step toward the remilitarization of West Germany may well be a step toward the moral and political disintegration of the Federal Republic which American money and influence have constructed with such painful care. The horse can be dragged to the water, but will it drink? And can it be ridden into battle?

What is perhaps worse, a wider survey of the European scene provides evidence that strengthening West Germany in the military sense will mean weakening the United States' other allies. To the thoughtful European, the Americans seem to have reached a crucial point in their destiny. They can press onward along the road they are now following—probably no one can stop them—but if they do, they will find their friends, one by one, falling behind until in the end they are alone—except for their former despised enemies.

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BOOKS *and the* ARTS

Moments of Vision

MAKE LIGHT OF IT. By William Carlos Williams. Random House. $3.50.

EARLY STORIES. By Elizabeth Bowen. Alfred A. Knopf. $3.

SUCH DARLING DODOS. By Angus Wilson. William Morrow and Company. $2.50.

"MAKE LIGHT OF IT," the collected stories of William Carlos Williams, a book that is all dry light, and Elizabeth Bowen's "Early Stories" sound as if they had been written out of an intense and critical joy in experience. Angus Wilson's stories, as any one of his characters might say, are another dish of tea.

Dr. Williams's prose is tight, economical but not bare, and never pretends to more than the author thinks or feels. These may sound like minor virtues, but they are exceedingly difficult to keep to and rare in contemporary American fiction. In this reprint of "The Knife of the Times" (1932), "Life Along the Passaic River" (1938), and twenty-one hitherto uncollected stories he re-creates in all its human wonder the sights and sounds and smells of his world, the dreary, half-suburban, half-metropolitan wasteland of Rutherford and Paterson, New Jersey, inhabited largely by a Polish and Italian proletariat which he loves.

He writes with a fine ambivalence, for he is at once the skilled doctor reporting on sickness, childbirth, and death, and the artist with all his wits about him and all his senses operating. He has a habit of identifying himself, for the moment, with those whom he observes and to whom he ministers. The illnesses in A Face of Stone and The Use of Force and the pregnancy in Comedy Entombed, to cite examples at random, have an immediacy that makes most contemporary fiction look like reflections seen through a glass darkly.

After too many years of patronizing and sentimental prating by writers who want to be profound about the little, the average, and the forgotten man it is refreshing to find Dr. Williams talking quietly about him and convincing us that he is always really singular and memorable. There is more to be learned about the depression or about the ruthlessness of large corporations from The Round-the-World Fliers and The Paid Nurse than from most of the heavily documented novels on such subjects of the last twenty-five years. Not that these stories are merely informative, although they show a wonderful sense of fact. They are informed with passion. Dr. Williams writes of being excited by or falling in love with his patients—an Italian woman in her fifth pregnancy, a sluttish girl suffering from acne, and so on. This is not rhetoric. He is not detached. What he sets down is recollected not in tranquillity but in a kind of critical happiness.

It would be pleasant to add that these are good short stories. For the most part they are not, at least in any conventional sense, although this judgment seems curiously irrelevant as soon as one has made it. To borrow a phrase from Hardy, they are moments of vision. With few exceptions, of which Old Doc Rivers is the most sustained, Dr. Williams is apparently not interested in developing or expanding his momentary insights. His compassion does not lead him beyond the luminous sketch. He takes human relationships for granted; they rarely change or grow. The Dawn of Another Day and To Fall Asleep, relatively ambitious pieces, do not resolve the situations they posit. But the reader has been, unforgettably, on that derelict yacht and in that suburban bedroom. Even when it smells somewhat of the clinic and the waiting-room, this writing is so alive that it leaves one questioning all one's views about the theory and practice of the short story.

If the insights are not always sure and if the situations seem, sometimes, not to have been felt through, still it is good to have Elizabeth Bowen's early stories. These include "Encounters" (1923) and "Ann Lee's" (1926). Very often "Encounters" sounds as if it had been influenced by Katherine Mansfield. But as Miss Bowen notes, in a wise preface which should be digested by anyone who wants to write fiction, when she wrote her first book she had read chiefly the stories of Richard Middleton and E. M. Forster and was altogether innocent of Bliss and The Garden Party. This is a minor fact in literary history but of some note, for it is evidence of the error of hasty generalizations about literary influences. These nebulosities may turn out to be merely resemblances in diverse sensibilities which happen more or less simultaneously to flower into art.

According to Miss Bowen the chief difficulty in the composition of these stories "was that I at that time could not extend my vision outside the range of an hour. I could spotlight, but not illumine steadily. I could expose people, but I was not yet interested in their continuity: I had a flitting mind." Their chief virtue is their freshness. She is all Miranda in this brave new world of sights and sounds—but chiefly sights—which unfolds itself for writer and reader alike. Some of her situations, she points out, were not well found; occasionally she patronizes her characters, an example, she calls it nicely, of "the repulsive superiority of young persons." But these lapses are infrequent. Already she knew, like the twelve-year-old in the fine story Coming Home—she tells us it is transposed autobiography—"that nothing ever became real for her until she had had time to live it over again." This is the lesson applied, with variations, in all these stories, as people, situations, and feelings grow into reality.

Of the first story in "Encounters," Breakfast, she comments that it is really not a story, since it has no turning point, but a sketch. Her Mr. Rossiter, who dies daily amid the vulgarities of a suburban boarding-house, is created and then dropped. Yet in this unpretentious piece she says, by implication, everything that Angus Wilson says over and over, the emphases becoming, finally, tiresome, in "Such Darling Dodos." His central thesis is that the English middle class, the dodos of the title, is falling apart as the assault upon its values and its customs begun by World War II and stepped up by the Labor government continues. Each one of these ten stories demonstrates this point in some in-

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genious fashion. Together they make up a study in dislocation. Everywhere Mr. Wilson sees vulgarity and simple nastiness increasing. But important fiction cannot be created out of grimly sustained dislike and in an absence of compassion. The very fact that the dislike is so consistently sustained enervates the writing, and what was intended as a series of deft and witty chronicles is repetitious and boring. ERNEST JONES

Society and Politics

THE OPEN SOCIETY AND ITS ENEMIES. By Karl R. Popper. Princeton University Press. $7.50.

HONESTY, even at the risk of adding inflationary pressures to a market already unjustifiably bullish, requires an indorsement of Karl Popper's "The Open Society and Its Enemies" as probably the most stimulating, original, and genuinely important book to appear in many years. Relatively unheralded in this country, Popper's book has gone through three printings in England, and changed minds at Oxford, where it was the subject of a special seminar. No mere review, as one writer has already observed, can "give an account of the wealth of historical, philological, political, educational, and logical suggestions contained in Popper's work." Indeed, it is even difficult to define its subject. With characteristic modesty Popper describes his book as a "kind of critical introduction to the philosophy of society and politics," but it is also, either as a whole or in part, a survey of Greek philosophy and modern philosophy since Kant, an essay in the logic of investigation, a treatise on the art of government, an inquiry into the aims of the social sciences, a history of the rise and fall of Athens, a formal philosophical critique of idealism, an analysis of the ideology of fascism and of its pervasive success, a study of the meaning of Marx, a storehouse of brilliant *aperçus*, and a defense, and in many ways model, of clarity, scientific method, and democratic procedure. No thinking person would be doing himself a service by neglecting Popper's book.

Fortunately, all the diverse inquiries pivot about a central argument which, consistently pushed ahead, forms the point of Popper's gigantic effort. Popper argues that a prime goal of social activity should be the establishment of an "open society." The "open society" which was first achieved, though only partially, by the Greeks, notably in Athens, is a society based on reason rather than taboo, and characterized by a distinction between the conventional regularities of social life, amenable to democratic control, and the regularities found in nature, which must be tended by a knowing élite. Consciousness of the possibilities for democratic management which is exemplified by the Periclean motto, "Although only a few may originate a policy, we are all able to judge it," leads to the notion of individual responsibility, and thence to egalitarianism and class mobility. Within the "open society" men are relatively free to rise and fall or remain indifferent. But the development of the "open society," a historical fact as well as a logical succession, has provoked sustained resistance down to and including modern fascism, which is "only an episode in the perennial struggle against freedom and reason." The men of the resistance in effect have opted for the "closed society," which resembles primitive tribal life in its magical attitude toward a social existence regulated by taboos which constrict the area of personal decision, submerge individualism in collective tradition, and establish unbreakable order as the answer to the insistent question of rank. The devices used to argue the return of the "closed society" are numerous, but one of the most common and effective techniques is what Popper calls historicism.

By historicism Popper means the proposition that history is a moving but immovable force with a discoverable direction to which men must accommodate themselves. This proposition, popular though demonstrably false, leads to moral futurism—the contention that men must cry "hail" to horror because it is allegedly imminent—and the myth of destiny, which implies inequality, racism, and mysticism: destiny's children, the chosen people, the master race, the proletariat, enjoy a blood superiority, incapable of achievement by mere effort or study, and they are dogmatically reinforced against rational criticism by their private, self-conscious identification with the forces of history. In addition, historicism begets utopianism—the doctrine that reform must be made in the light of some ultimate political aim, usually happiness—which in its turn, by demanding a clean slate for a new beginning in harmony with "history," begets totalitarianism.

Since the days of Heraclitus the historicist line has been hawked to a long-suffering public, who, Popper says, quoting Samuel Butler, "are easily led by the nose, and quick to offer up common sense at the altar of logic when a philosopher arises among them." As preeminent among the high priests supervising the slaughter of mind, Popper counts Plato, an aristocrat of great argumentative agility and sociological acumen who betrayed his teacher Socrates to become "a totalitarian party politician, unsuccessful in his immediate and practical undertaking, but in the long run only too successful in his propaganda for the arrest and overthrow of a civilization which he hated." At the fount of modern historicism squats Hegel, spewing out ponderous nonsense designed to transform history into a court of justice which has recommended a "blind obedience" to the existing, and therefore rational, and therefore divine, state of Frederick William III. Hegel, Popper asserts, connected Plato with modern totalitarianism by developing a theory of the modern nation-state as the bearer of destiny's word. But Hegel's influence, though in-

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tense, hardly extended beyond the gentle classes, and the great modern popularizer of historicism was Karl Marx. Popper begins his treatment of Marx by applauding Marx's great humanitarianism, to which he traces Marx's popularity, and by noting the value of the Marxian suggestion that the cause of the toiling masses could most effectively be furthered by a shortening of the working day. Popper also pays tribute to two of Marx's admittedly exaggerated methodological suggestions: "the need for considering things in relation to their economic background," and the virtue of allowing sociology to go beyond an examination of individual intent into structural analysis. Finally, however, Popper concludes that Marx was in large measure a historicist who blinded himself and crippled his followers by the attempt to predict a necessary historical development which would bring superiority to a chosen people whose destined rise to power might legitimately be hastened, but only hastened, by the use of means formally prescribed by existing society. Popper finds that Marx grievously neglected the acceptable means for reform, which have in fact proved the most useful.

This neglect still exists, and indeed the historicist tradition has been continued, not only by the Communist and fascist heirs of Marx, but also by the German existentialists with their emphasis on demonic forces lurking in the next moment, by Karl Mannheim and the sociology-of-knowledge school with their concept of a total ideology which can be penetrated only by a few freely poised spirits, by Arnold Toynbee and by A. N. Whitehead, who is sharply criticized for his contention that science rests upon metaphysical speculation, and that accordingly scientific progress rests upon a change in the prior irrational commitment necessary to all thought.

As to what progress is possible, Popper has modest hopes which are nevertheless hopes. He believes that speculation about ultimately desirable political conditions should be replaced by "piecemeal social engineering," the consideration of distinct, practical problems subject to institutional rather than discretionary individual control, such as the problems of social security, literacy, and the curbing of monopoly. Social scientists should concentrate on an explanation of the unintended results that may arise from suggested institutional reforms. And historians should devote their efforts to an identification and analysis of past problems which may have current relevance. By such a functional approach, Popper suggests, the little progress of which man is capable, the reduction of a part of all that is wild and random to the realm of the controllable, may be achieved.

Popper's program, while hardly stirring, is in itself thoroughly acceptable, but doubtless much criticism will be forthcoming as to the accuracy of Popper's interpretation of particular philosophers. The only advance reply to such criticism is that Popper's documentary justification is admirably thorough, and the internal argument thoroughly convincing. That Popper's final program seems somewhat pale does, however, serve to indicate one general weakness which weaves through the book. Popper is only occasionally, and then only belatedly, aware of the bewilderment and frustration produced by the absence of certainty and order, and the need for renouncing aesthetic perfection implicit in the "open society." The proponents of the "closed society" feed on chronic dissatisfaction and not on primitive atavism or the sway of Plato. Their message gets across because it answers a real need. Popper's effort to discredit this need by connecting the "closed society" with primitive yearnings is not thoroughly successful and, in any case, carries with it no imperative prescription. And to hold "social philosophies . . . responsible for the widespread prejudice against the possibilities of democratic reform" is as remote an explanation of democratic apathy as the statement that Wilson "fell a victim to his upbringing in the metaphysical political theories of Plato and Hegel and to the nationalist movements based upon them" is an unsatisfactory explanation of the temporary success of the doctrine of self-determination. In short, Popper exaggerates the role of philosophy in stimulating what is in fact a self-sustaining resistance to the "open society." Historicism is more deeply rooted and, by so much, more of a curse than Popper imagines.

But optimism in such matters is surely a venial sin. And Popper's firm insistence that "we must go on into the unknown, the uncertain, and insecure, using what reason we may have to plan for both security *and* freedom," places him, if not on the side of the angels whose company he would doubtless spurn as a snare, at least with the little band of man's best friends.

JOSEPH KRAFT

Books in Brief

THE HELL BOMB. By William L. Laurence. Knopf. $2.75. The science reporter for the New York *Times* describes for the layman the theory, nature, and potentialities of the hydrogen bomb, the first of which, he believes, may be ready for testing before the end of the year. The appropriately named hell bomb can destroy all life within an area of over three hundred square miles and severely burn within an area of more than twelve hundred square miles. Its advantage to us, therefore, lies in the fact that it would neutralize military disparity by enabling us to destroy Russian armies in the field before they had a chance to overrun Europe. The atom bomb, on the other hand, owing to its comparatively small area of destructiveness, is primarily a weapon for strategic bombing against concentrated populations and industrial centers. Thus the H-bomb might be hailed as a means of getting war back to its original purpose of killing soldiers rather than civilians. However, H-bombs can be rigged with casings capable of exploding into radioactive dust that can wipe out life throughout an entire country or even the whole world—a temptation that the military mind, in a struggle for survival, might find difficult to resist.

ATOMIC ENERGY AND THE HYDROGEN BOMB. By Gerald Wendt. Medill McBride. $2.75. Dr. Wendt gives less space than Mr. Laurence to the military and political aspects of nuclear fission (the basis of the A-bomb) and nuclear fusion (the basis of the H-bomb) and more to the scientific aspects. He is also considerably more pessimistic—or should one say optimistic?—regarding the chance of quick and successful manufacture of the H-bomb, which he says will apparently not be attained for years if ever. Moreover, he

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believes its discovery a disadvantage to America because of our greater concentration of population and industry. The two authors agree that in the hell bomb humanity has at last achieved the possibility of collective suicide.

THE ATOM AT WORK. By Jacob Sacks. Ronald Press. $4. Atomic energy can transform earth into paradise or into hell, with the odds at the moment on its doing the latter. Messrs. Laurence and Wendt deal with the destructive aspects; Dr. Sacks with the constructive. The first half of the book recounts the discoveries that led to the use of atomic energy; the second half tells how radioactive isotopes are employed in chemistry, biology, agriculture, and industry. A factual work for study and reference.

ROMMEL, THE DESERT FOX. By Desmond Young. Harper. $3.50. The North African campaigns were not only "a gentlemen's war," as one German general remarked, but a tactician's delight, with unlimited space for maneuver and no civilians to get in the way. As military history this is a book of extraordinary interest, but even more fascinating is the dramatic and detailed story—already covered but more briefly in General Speidel's "Invasion, 1944"—of Rommel's last days and of his forced suicide on orders from Hitler.

THE SKY CLEARS. POETRY OF THE AMERICAN INDIANS. Edited by A. Grove Day. Macmillan. $3. An interesting, thoroughgoing, and informative volume, whose method is to present the verse of the American Indian in categories according to the culture from which it rose. Unhappily, as Dr. Day notes in his introduction, the most profound students of American Indian lore have not always been the most expert practitioners of verse, or vice versa, and while he comments in his introduction on the difference between literal and literary translations, he does not seem entirely convinced that the latter is sometimes the less poetic. The name of Mary Austin does not appear in his list of translators, or that of Oliver LaFarge in his bibliography. One notes, with a rueful satisfaction, that the poetry of the noble red man was also frequently "intentionally cryptic, ambiguous, or esoteric."

Drama

MARGARET MARSHALL

THE heroine of "The Rose Tattoo," Tennessee Williams's new play (Martin Beck Theater), is a Sicilian, Serafina Delle Rose; the locale is "a village populated mostly by Sicilians somewhere along the Gulf Coast between New Orleans and Mobile." Mr. Williams has recently spent some time in Italy. Serafina, like Blanche in "A Streetcar Named Desire," is a frustrated woman, but she has the Mediterranean attitude toward sex, and unlike Blanche is voluble and frank about its "glory." Moreover, in the end she finds happiness again with one of those lusty fellows that Mr. Williams delights to set before us. His treatment of the single-minded Serafina appears at times more condescending than compassionate, but it is free of the overtones of sadism that marked his dissection of Blanche.

The first act is by far the best, and it is the first act of a serious play. Serafina's husband, "wild as a gipsy" and a baron besides, for all that he is a truck-driver who carries dope under his ostensible freight, is killed shortly after the action begins. Serafina so treasures the memory of their "glory" together that she renounces all other men—and central to her renunciation is her belief that her husband has shared the glory only with her. At the end of the first act three years have passed, Serafina suspects that her husband was not faithful after all, and her repression shows itself in an exaggerated attachment to religion and a determination to keep men away from her fifteen-year-old daughter.

So far so good. This first act is vivid and humorous—but within the terms of the prevailing serious mood—and it has the poetic touches characteristic of Mr. Williams's writing at its best. In the second act the serious mood quickly evaporates, and the proceedings descend into cheap farce which must be seen to be believed. The absurd and the vulgar contend for place in the sequence in which the new truck-driver finally overcomes Serafina's scruples. And this is matched by a scene in which the fifteen-year-old daughter attempts to seduce a nice young sailor and is not deterred even by his pathetic remark that it could cost him ten years.

In the third act Serafina once more feels on her breast the impress of the rose tattoo—the insignia of her dead husband—and knows that she has con-

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ceived; the daughter goes off happily, with her mother's blessing, to spend the afternoon in a hotel with the sailor.

The play is good theater in the elementary sense. It is well directed, the setting is striking, the acting is good. Maureen Stapleton as Serafina plays the part as if she believed in it and makes it more believable than it would be, I suspect, in print. I should say that the character of the new lover, Mangiacavallo, as written, is the best realized of the lot, and Eli Wallach brings him to life on the stage. The part of the daughter is a pretty thankless one. Phyllis Love's portrayal is not very convincing, in spite of her skilful and devoted efforts, and is made less so by the fact that Miss Love can't help looking and seeming more American than Sicilian, rather than the other way round. Of the minor characters, Ludmilla Toretzka's Assunta is particularly good, and the Sicilian neighbors seem much more authentic than the principals. I almost forgot to note that one of the characters is a goat, played by a goat, which goes on a rampage at two critical points in the ordeal of Serafina. And I can only say that this bit of "symbolism" was nothing if not appropriate.

Mr. Williams has creative power and a gift for dramatic and poetic expression, but he writes from so many levels of thought and feeling—and some of them are so low—that I for one can't make him out. It would be easy to conclude from this play that he is primarily a sensationalist whose "serious" touches are part of a technique, instinctive or deliberate, to provide something for everybody; it would be more charitable to assume that he is primarily a serious writer who is incapable of exercising the faintest critical judgment toward his own effusions.

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Art

MANNY FARBER

BY THE word "abstraction" painters mean composition freed of naturalistic appearance, experience communicated by relationships of color, line, space, and so on. The Museum of Modern Art's latest survey—running from the 1913 Armory show to De Kooning's largest all-over pattern of squirming, bio-morphic strokes—indicates that American abstraction is generally a fussy dissertation in flat space. The show wriggles through eight rooms, in which the white walls, the practical character of American painting, and the absence of ornate frames give the resolved effect of a tidy New England asylum.

The first wave of abstraction (1912-25) shows artists using Futurist "lines of force" and Cubist shapes with the dry dogmatism of protestants against academic technique and philistine critics. Life's noise, speed, and confusion were depicted in kaleidoscopic designs that either half transformed nature or disowned it to produce sensations of dynamism and color music. During the depression years the second wave (1930-51) washed up clean, still lifelike abstractions—a flat backdrop of decorative color patterned with simultaneous aspects of a salt shaker—which were orderly reactions against the troubled times, the congested scene paintings of Benton, Curry. In the mid-forties the young avant-gardist sold abstraction to the American public with his sophisticated approach that trusted the pull of spontaneous, irrational impulses, and advanced post-Cubist technique into a new all-over patterning devoid of objects. The last exhibition room is pledged to these intrasubjectivists—Pollock, Hoffman, Rothko, and others—who have now perfected their slap-happy, wallpaper technique to an elegant point, dangerously close to the empty stylishness of academic art.

The American painter approaches independent art—composition without subject interest—with the functional, efficient spirit of people who believe in "getting down to brass tacks." From Feininger's frosted use of kinetic design to Pollock's glum idolatry of automatic writing, strict obedience to the principle underlying an art style makes the work appear cold and persistent. The artist not only pushes one principle to the exclusion of all else, but the quick, largely decorative solving of each canvas unmasks the expedience and intensity of young Americans out to "succeed." Once his technique is mastered, he becomes an assembly belt turning out the same machine in varying colors, sizes, and shapes. Art schools now find students masterfully covering stretched mattress ticking with aluminum house paint—no model, no subject, no composition, and soon—"Look, Ma! no hands."

In sculpture the Americans' absorption in "method" has a truer ring because the aesthetic is unavoidably joined with problems of construction. In the metallic works of Calder, Smith, Lassaw, the artist's personality is drawn into the form by means of his arduous labor, while painters, fascinated by the mechanics of expression, lay feeling over structure like a sentimental veneer. Sculptor Lassaw, a sensitive materialist, builds an elongated nest of cubicles with a continuous string of plastic metal, the tedious repetition of stretched, molten drippings exuding a handsome milky-gray atmosphere. Winding, changing width, plodding along at a snail's pace, the line has the sensuality of a heavy, langorous doodle. My first association with Noguchi's five-foot "Gunas" is of three loose keyholes cut from a marble bathtub. With wafer-thin organic shapes that can unlock like collapsible furniture, Noguchi communicates technical difficulties along with an icy-fingered but admirable formal talent.

Among the better painters, James Brooks contributes a mystic landscape done with a weird paint-blot technique. Seeping blackish tints into both sides of a porous canvas, Brooks develops a translucent mire with magical white writing and tangling curvilinear shapes. The result is poetic chaos in a bottomless subterranean world, rich in atmospheric color and trick effects. The painting—tissue-paper thin and deep as a dream, quagmire-surfaced and with a

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desert's dryness—suffers somewhat from virtuosity.

The leaders of current abstraction are capable of more fireworks and elegant acrobatics, but the following works get closer to the nervous apprehensive flavor of current times. Russell's "La Rue Saint Denis" suggests a tenth-floor view into a busy intersection with everything abstracted into narrow rectangles of pasty color. This finicky labor holds the eye through the fine contrast between tiny, pure foreground colors and larger, background tones which expand and change to a ponderous glow. Cavallon's checkerboard looks like a Mondrian painted by a peasant: no two rectangles the same size, roughly edged contours, primitively built color. Because of sensuality that mixes a worn ivory tone into an old-fashioned palette, this geometrical composition exudes warmth, taste, some of the crudeness missed in Bauhaus-type art. Guston's panel of gummy red eeriness is also a clumsy work full of the joys and errors that come from pursuing emotion down a dark, uncharted path.

Records

B. H. HAGGIN

CERTAIN of the Prades Bach Festival recordings issued by Columbia are among the outstanding events of the year; and first among these are the ones of Casals's own playing. It is heard in the three Sonatas originally for viola da gamba—Nos. 1 and 2 on one record (ML-4349), No. 3 on another (ML-4350)—with the keyboard instrument part played on the piano by Paul Baumgartner; and one finds no change in the tone that is unique in its tensile strength and continuous life, or in the powerful inflections and distentions of this tone in the sustained phrasing. The music has always impressed me as dull; but Nos. 1 and 2 played by Casals are exciting experiences. No. 3 remains dull—which may be connected with the fact that Casals's tone is altered and less impressive in this work.

On the same record with No. 3 are the Chromatic Fantasy and Fugue and the Italian Concerto played on the piano by Serkin in a way that contrasts strikingly with Casals's. The great *Andante* movement of the Concerto, though played *Adagio*, is played very simply with none of the tensions and the continuity of impetus that create exciting life in Casals's phrasing of melody. Nor is there any other kind of strength in Serkin's playing—now lyrically contemplative, now fluently animated—of the other music; and indeed one is glad that he doesn't this time strain for anything more than the small-scale playing he does naturally.

After the recordings of Casals's own playing the most interesting are those of the performances he conducted. One record (ML-4345) gives us the first three Brandenburg Concertos, another (ML-4346) the next two, and another (ML-4347) No. 6; and the performances are the only ones that seem to me to be, in their completely different style, of the same stature and impressiveness as the wonderful old Busch Chamber Players performances. As against the Busch performances with their lightness, grace, clarity of texture, sensitiveness of inflection, refinement of execution, the Casals performances achieve magnificence, in certain movements, by fullness of sonority and powerful accentuation and shaping. There is good playing by the soloists in Nos. 2 and 4—Alexander Schneider, violin, M. Mule, soprano saxophone (in place of trumpet), John Wummer, flute, and Marcel Tabuteau, oboe, in No. 2; Schneider, Wummer, and B. Goldberg, flute, in No. 4. In No. 5 Szigeti plays well, but a little too loud for Wummer at times; and Eugene Istomin's piano playing is sensitive and straightforward except in the long solo, in which he indulges in too many changes of tempo. But the outstanding solo performance is Tabuteau's in the *Adagio* of No. 1; and there is beautiful playing also by the other oboes, L. Storch and J. Mack, the bassoon, M. Allard, and the horns, L. Thevet and G. Coursier, in the other movements. It is difficult to understand why, if Casals is willing to use a piano so that the keyboard part may be audible in No. 5, he uses a mostly inaudible harpsichord in the others. The recorded sound is a little brash; Nos. 1 and 5 have crackling noises and acquire a hash of high-frequency distortion near the center of the record.

On the same record with No. 6, the dullest of the series, are three excerpts from "The Musical Offering"—the not-too-interesting Ricercare a 3, played with power on the piano by Leopold Mannes; the dull Sonata a 3, played by Schneider, Wummer, L. Teraspulsky, cello, and Mannes; and the superb Ricercare a 6, excellently played by Schneider and Orrea Pernel, violins, M. Thomas and K. Tuttle, violas, Teraspulsky and D. Saidenberg, cellos, and J. Rotenberg, bass. The recorded sound of the last two is afflicted with gritty noise and distortion.

What I said about the performances of the Brandenburg Concertos is true also of the performances of the charming Suite No. 2 for flute and strings and the dull Suite No. 1 (ML-4348)—with the one additional difference from the Busch performance of No. 2 that Wummer's playing is not as beautiful in tone and phrasing as Moyse's. The recorded sound is weak in bass.

On another record (ML-4352)

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Crossword Puzzle No. 400

BY FRANK W. LEWIS



ACROSS

1 See 11
9 Key saw the flag in this light. (7)
10 It's light, but still quite an achievement for her to carry. (7)
11 and 1 across. The line of attack in '50? (6-6, 8)
12 Researches, perhaps, when the draughtsmen get upset. (8)
14 The kind of Roman Caesar was. (7)
15 See 27
17 Right name for championship. (5)
19 H_3BO_3 is such an acid. (7)
21 Strictly speaking, anything 9 would likely be this. (8)
23 and 8. Draft, perhaps. (4, 2, 4)
25 Animals are precious things to an Americanized editor. (7)
26 Camels come from here with almost all of their germs. (7)
27 and 15 across. The fight one engages in with a corporation? (3, 6, 2, 3, 5)

DOWN

1 The law of representation? (9)
2 Rain god pertaining to an ancient king of Phrygia. (7)
3 Without one, no motion could go into the record. (9)
4 Make sport of the traveler. (4)
5 Thinkers, or just throw-backs? (10)
6 A line of shale fragments. (5)
7 Late riser around here, according to Cicero. (7)
8 See 23.
13 Damp? Damper! (3, 7)
15 His most famous tales took only a hundredth as long to tell as Scheherazade's. (9)
16 Speak to Eva softly, and disappear! (9)
18 Three expressions of contempt for winning? (7)
20. Drake's Fay was the guilty one. (7)
21 The revelry seems to be a bloody mess! (4)
22 You couldn't say "he doesn't have a bob to his name!" about this expatriate Englishman! (5)
24 One would expect a gardener's son to sound competent! (4)

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SOLUTION TO PUZZLE No. 399

ACROSS:—1 METAPHYSICIAN; 11 and 10 LA GUARDIA FIELD; 12 OMNIBUSES; 13 ESTER; 14 TRIAL BALLOON; 19 QUEEN OF CLUBS; 22 AMISS; 24 POWER SAWS; 25 EXTIRPATE; 26 NOMAD; 27 NEXT TO NOTHING.

DOWN:—2 EXEUNT; 3 ALDEBARAN; 4 HALF-STAFF; 5 SAGES; 7 AUDITION; 8 AFOOT; 9 PATRONS; 15 BELOW ZERO; 16 LABYRINTH; 17 SQUARES; 18 BELITTLE; 20 and 6 SALMON CHASE; 21 ASIDE; 23 SPRAT; 24 PLATO.

Readers are invited to send for a free copy of Mr. Lewis's "ground rules." Address requests to Puzzle Dept., The Nation, 20 Vesey Street, New York 7, New York.

Szigeti plays the violin version of the great Concerto in D minor that he recorded years ago with the New Friends Orchestra, and plays it less well this time, I think—his tone being wiry and granular. The recorded sound of the orchestra is more spacious this time, but brash; that of the violin is sharp, and distorted near the center of the record. The Concerto in A minor played on the piano, violin, and flute by Horszowski, Schneider, and Wummer on the reverse side I don't care for; and its recorded sound is brash and sharp.

Nor do I care for the Concerto in C minor for violin and oboe (ML-4351) played by Isaac Stern and Tabuteau, which acquires a hash of high-frequency distortion near the center. But on the reverse side is the most satisfactory performance so far of the fine Concerto in D minor for two violins; though one notes things like Schneider's choppy phrasing of the opening statement of the *Andante* movement and then the continuous flow of Stern's phrasing of the answering statement.

Stern also plays beautifully in the *Andante* of the Violin Concerto in A minor, another good work, but throws his virtuoso-violinist weight around in the phrases of the other movements. The recorded sound is compressed and unresonant. On the same record (ML-4353) is the dull Concerto in F minor, played on the piano quite well, except for occasional unsteadiness of tempo, by Clara Haskil. The recorded sound needs stepping up of treble, which also steps up surface noise. Also on the record are the fine Toccata and Fugue in E minor, the Fugue played by Istomin not as straightforwardly as it should be, but the rest done very well; and an uninteresting Trio Sonata played by Stern, Wummer, and Istomin.

And finally a record (ML-4354) with the Sonata in B minor for flute and piano, most of it uninteresting, played by Wummer and Mannes; the English Suite No. 5, some of it rather engaging, and some movements played charmingly by Horszowski but others played in excessively romantic style; and the Prelude and Fugue in E flat minor from Book 1 of the Well-Tempered Clavier, well played on the piano by Yvonne Lefebure except that the Fugue is treated as a crescendo from *pp* to *ff* and a decrescendo back to *pp*.

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LETTERS TO THE EDITORS

The Guilt Clause Again

Dear Sirs: The Guilt Clause again. We have branded the Chinese people—in their absence. This means a war of extermination, or it means nothing. We may conquer them, that is to say, torture them into repeating the imposed formula. And all this, whether on the idealistic plane or the practical, is worse than futile.

In 1914 the Germans were manifestly guilty. They admitted it on November 9, 1918, by overthrowing the imperial government. They would have accepted their full share of responsibility at Versailles if they had been allowed to discuss their case. They were forced into submission ("unconditional surrender"), and the Guilt Clause poisoned the world until it produced Hitler.

The one judicial and realistic way of establishing responsibility is by an orderly trial, not by accepting as final the statement of the prosecutor. Let the Chinese appear before a jury of their peers, that is, before the United Nations. A verdict secured in the absence of the accused has not even a semblance of legal value. The first step is therefore to invite the Chinese People's Republic to join the United Nations. Then the case should be discussed honestly, with no attempt to save face or appease opponents at home, and with no effort to bribe or coerce the jurors.

ALBERT GUERARD

Waltham, Mass., February 1

Germans Don't Want War

Dear Sirs: According to an Analysis of the Military Situation in Europe published in the Basel *National Zeitung* of Switzerland and widely discussed in the United States, the marshals of the Soviet army fear a new German army far more than the atomic bomb. It is clear to us in Germany that the writer of the article wished to further the use of the Germans—80 per cent of whom oppose rearmament—as cannon fodder and to preserve the neutral and protected status of a people which has never participated in previous wars.

Apparently he does not understand the methods of psychological warfare, which played such an important part in the last two conflicts. The Russian soldiers, regardless of whether they are hated or liked, are good soldiers. Front-line troops do not judge their opponents by their party affiliations or ideologies but by their fighting qualities. Both Germans and Russians realized in the last war that it is discipline rather than doctrine that makes good troops. Today, if the Russians respect and fear the German soldiers, there are as many Germans who respect and fear the Russian soldiers.

The Swiss analyst is only partly right when he says that the Germans are willing to fight again. There is a desire among some of them to regain lost territories by force. But the refugees from the East are a small minority in Germany, and even among them there are sane observers who realize what the cost would be of the forceful repatriation of a former German population of, say, four or five million. Despite misleading reports in the press, most Germans now recognize that war does not pay.

Give us Germans the democracy we were promised in 1945. Give us fair play, social justice, and freedom from fear, and no nation will have to be afraid of our aggression. Above all give the ex-soldiers, the parents of young men, and the war orphans of the world a decisive vote for peace or war. Let those who have experienced the horrors of war and no longer believe in state-organized murder decide the question. We who have survived the war acknowledge the sacred duty to see that hatreds, bloodshed, and social injustice vanish from this war-tired earth.

OSCAR C. PFAUS

Hamburg, Germany, January 27

Honi Soit . . .

Dear Sirs: A Samuel Johnson anecdote serves as an apt comment on the current controversy over "The Miracle":

A bystander asked Johnson when they were both looking at a painting in the British Museum:

"Don't you think this picture is obscene?"

"No," thundered the old bear, "but your question is."

VICTOR PAGET

New York, January 31

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

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